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THE purpose of this paper is to discuss the significance of various
measures of monopoly power and concentration for both economic
analysis and public policy. It is perhaps a sign of the immaturity of
the Science of economics that the notion should persist that the
competitiveness of the economy or of a sector of the economy can
ultimately be characterized by some single number or set of num-
bers. One might have supposed that theoretical and empirical devel-
opments in the last two decades would have brought home the
essentially heterogeneous nature of our industrial structure and be-
havior.1 But the illusion still persists in influential quarters that
there is some simple key which will enable us to separate the monop-
olistic from the competitive. This paper is designed not to disparage
progress to date but rather by underlining its limitations to suggest
the magnitude of the task ahead.
1. Aspects of Competition
THE interests of economists in measures of monopoly and competi-
tion have been mixed. In part the interest has been in economic
analysis, i.e. in distinguishing market situations according to such
characteristics as the objective market conditions, the processes of
decision making, or economic results. But much of the work in the
field has been oriented quite understandably to issues of public
policy, i.e. toward distinguishing desirable from undesirable market
situations, workable from unworkable competition, etc. The policy
approach may be at once both narrower and broader than the ana-
lytical. It is often narrower in that attention is focused on variables
1See,for example, Edward H. Chamberlin, "Monopolistic Competition Re.
visited," Economica, November 1951,pp.343-362; Friedrich A. Hayek, Individu-
alism and Economic Order (University of Chicago Press, 1948), Chap.Joe S.
Bain, 'Price and Production Policies," in Howard S. Ellis, editor, A Survey of
Contemporary Economics (Blakiston, 1948); John M. Clark, "Toward a Concept
of Workable Competition," American Economic Review, June 1940,pp.241-256;
Arthur R. Burns, The Decline of Competition (McGraw-Hill, 1936); Clair Wil-
cox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, Temporary National
Economic Committee, Monograph 21,1940.
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that are operationally measurable and upon identifying situations
where itis feasible both politically and administratively to take
action. Certain analytically significant factors may therefore be left
out of consideration. But the policy approach may also be broader
in some respects since it is concerned with such noneconomic aspects
of market situations as the effects of market structures and practices
upon political structures and the processes of political power, upon
career opportunities and the processes of personnel selection, or
upon the development of human personalities and the distribution
of prestige. These noneconomic factors have bulked large in some
of the discussions of antitrust policy, although little effort has been
made to define with care the issues involved or to correlate kinds
of market structures and practices with various political or social
effects.2
Even when looking at the purely economic aspects of market sit-
uations, various economists have emphasized different aspects of the
situations including:
i. The objective characteristics of the market, e.g. the number
and size of the decision-making units, the ease of entry, the charac-
teristics of the product, the characteristics of the buyers, and the
rate of growth and age of the industry.
2. The power of the decision-making unit, i.e. the kinds and ex-
tent of discretion available to the decision-making unit consistent
with survival.
.Theactivities of decision-making units, i.e. the exercise of dis-
cretion with respect to internal activities such as the use of re-
sources, research and development, and investment policies and with
respect to such external activities as the shaping of preferences, mar-
ket development, pricing, procurement, and related trade practices. .Theeconomic effects of the activities of decision-making units,
i.e. the effects of economic activities in bringing about a mutual
adaptation of wants and resources, including the rate of economic
development, the allocation of resources and the efficiency with
which they are used, and the allocation of income, and wealth.
Differences in emphasis depend in part upon differences in the
value orientation of various students. But more important are the
differences in vision as to the nature of the competitive process, dif-
2 It is clear from the legislative, administrative, and judicial history of our
antitrust laws that noneconomic factors have played an important part in shap-
ing policy in this area.
8 See for example, Bain, o. cit., pp. i6o-i6i.
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ferences that are likely to remain substantial until we develop a
verified theory of market structures and behavior.4 The limiting
cases of markets characterized by perfect competition and perfect
monopoly are reasonably well understood. But, although there has
been a good deal of exploratory work in the areas between, these
areas have proved relatively intractable to the traditional methods
of economics.
While the current body of theory provides a useful frame of ref-
erence for ordering empirical data and analyzing problems of policy,
itis important to recognize certain limitations of this body of
thought for the purpose at hand, limitations arising from the fact
that the modern theory of the firm and market behavior is largely
a by-product of efforts to refine the neo-classical theory of perfect
competition. The essence of the perfectly competitive market is a
condition in which the function of the firm is simply to adapt its
input and output decisions in the light of market-determined prices.
Significant deviations from the principle of profit maximization are
incompatible with survival. Activities are confined, therefore, by the
nature of the market structure to deciding the volume of inputs and
outputs in light of the maximizing principle and to administering
resources within the firm.
In an economy characterized by the Schumpeterian circular flow,
4Inhis summary comments on a symposium conducted on the effectiveness of
the antitrust laws, Dexter M. Keezer remarks "... onefact seems to emerge
with increasing clarity. This fact...isthat the concepts of competition and of
a 'broadly competitive system' are so diverse that they offer wide latitude for
difference of opinion as to the effectiveness of the antitrust laws ... untilwe ex-
pose the various and complicated strands of our concepts of competition, and
then put them together in a clear-cut design which we all understand and accept,
our chances of charting clearly how well we are doing in preserving and pro-
tecting competition will be seriously compromised." "The Antitrust Laws; A
Symposium," American Economic Review, June 1949, pp. 722-723.
5 "Disencumbered,however, of all the limitations and taboos implied in the
classical assumptions, the way is now open for the building up of a different
type of economics. Instead of drawing its substance from arbitrary assumptions,
chosen for their simplicity and unduly extended to the whole field of economic
activity, our theory may turn to more pedestrian, but more fruitful methods. It
will recognize the richness and variety of all concrete cases, and tackle each
problem with due respect for its individual aspects. .
"Weare rightly dissatisfied with the distorted picture of economic life which
classical theory has bequeathed us. Subconsciously, however, we keep hoping for
some other grand formula that would unravel as simply and elegantly the in-
finite complexity of our modern world. For economics to progress, it must give
up its youthful quest for a philosophers' stone." Robert Triffin, Monopolistic
Competition and General Equilibrium Theory (Harvard University Press, io),
p. 189.Seealso William Fellner. Competition among the Few (Knopf, s949), espe-
cially pp. 3-15.
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it is assumed that individual preference scales, the body of knowl-
edge, production functions, and the volume and efficiency of re-
sources are fixed. It is usually further assumed that these variables
are independent both of one another and of economic activity. Under
less restrictive assumptions of an economy subject to fluctuation and
secular change these variables may be conceived as subject to change.
But in the case of perfect competition, such change is assumed
to be exogenous to the firm. Even in such a world of change, the
function of the firm in the perfectly competitive market is viewed
as simply the adaptation of inputs and outputs to changes in market
prices that in turn reflect changes in preference scales, the body of
knowledge, production functions, and the supply of resources. The
continuation of a condition of perfect competition is viewed as in-
compatible with activities by the firm designed to change these basic
parameters of the system.
In the development theories of monopolistic or imperfectly com-
petitive markets it has often been assumed that preferences, re-
sources, the body of knowledge, and production functions are fixed
or at least independent of the activities of the firm. As a result, the
function of the firm has been conceived as that of adapting inputs
and outputs in the light of these parameters and of specified condi-
tions of interdependence between firms. The principal exceptions
to this have been the attempts, as yet not too successful, to intro-
duce advertising into the body of economic theory° and the work of
Schumpeter who insisted on the innovating functions of the entre-
preneur.7
In considering the various measures of monopoly power, it is im-
portant to bear in mind the limitations of the analytical models
from which they arose, especially their preoccupation with price and
output decisions to the exclusion of other activities. But the essence
of much business behavior is the conscious attempt to shape prefer-
ences; to develop new resources; to seek, adapt, and add to the body
of knowledge; to protect and extend market positions, thereby re-
shaping market structures; to influence interdependence by learning
about the reactions of others and by affecting the expectations upon
which others act.
8 See especially Edward H. Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition (Harvard
University Press, 1953). Also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price(rev. ed.,
Macmillan, 1952), pp. 207-209; N. S. Buchanan, 'Advertising Expenditures; A
Suggested Treatment," Journal of Political Economy, August 1942, pp. 537-557.
7 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles (McGraw-Hill, 1939), i, 2-s; Capital-
ism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper, 1942), Chap. 8.
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This view of the function of the firm implies that the processes of
competition are infinitely more complex than is often assumed, and
that the links between objective conditions, economic power, activi-
ties, and results are more involved than is often represented. Over
a wide area of modern industry the important factor i6 the existence
of a range of discretion often used in ways that violate the static
assumptions. Our real interest is less in the state of monopoly or
competition than in the process of competing and monopolizing.
•.themodern theory of competitive equilibrium assumes the
situation to exist which a true explanation ought to account for as
the effect of the competitive process."8 We should aim at devising
measures characterizing not the state of monopoly but rather the
nature of the competitive process conceived as a process of innova-
tion and adaptation proceeding through time.
2. Theoretical Indexes of Monopoly and Competition
SEVERAL attempts to define theoretical indexes of monopoly power
approach the problem from the point of view of the individual firm,
although they can be adapted to the situation of a group of firms
acting in concert. These indexes arise in general from the Static
theory of the firm and have the limitations attached thereto. With
the exception of the Lerner index, the operational usefulness of
these indexes is not great since they assume some knowledge of the
elasticity or cross-elasticity of demand, knowledge that is generally
hard to come by.
LERNER INDEX
PERHAPS the most famous of the indexes of monopoly power is that
of Lerner,° m= (price—marginal cost)/price. This index, m, may
be equal to, greater than, or less than zero according as the product
is sold at, above, or below marginal cost.
The Lerner indexis clearly not a good indicator of differences in
objective conditions of the market. To be sure, in the limiting case
of a profit maximizing firm in equilibrium, the Lerner index is the
inverse of the elasticity of demand and may, therefore, be taken as
a characterization of the demand for the product of the firm. But
in the case of a nonmaximizing firm it is no guide to the nature of
demand.
8Hayek,o. cit., p. 94.
9A.P. Lerner, "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly
Power," Review of Economic Studies (ig.i9),pp.'7-'7.
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It is essentially an index of the extent of divergence from marginal
cost pricing. As such it is an indicator of one aspect of the economic
results of business behavior, and its significance depends on the
relevance of marginal cost pricing as a condition of the desirable
allocation of resources.'° But at best the Lerner index is a limited
index of results. While it indicates the divergence between marginal
cost and price, it tells nothing about the extent to which market
pressures or administrative action keep the costs at a minimum in
the light of the existing body of knowledge, or to what extent com-
petitive pressures stimulate costly sales effort and firms of uneco-
nomic size, or to what extent the potentialities of technological de-
velopment are being exploited. Although the Lerner indexis
designed primarily to indicate the effects of economic activities upon
the allocation of economic resources, it has all the limitations of the
static model from which it is derived. For a sector of the economy
approaching the state of the Schumpeterian circular flow it may be
reasonably useful, but even here it may fail to distinguish between
firms operating along minimum cost functions and those which are
not. For a world of fluctuation and growth its use is limited. Any given
value of the index for a sector of the economy may be consistent
with various total conditions of the sector and with various rates of
change. The index makes no allowance for differences in activities
of the firm in shaping preferences and developing resources, for dif-
ferent degrees of initiative in seeking, adapting, and adding to the
body of knowledge, for various rates of fluctuation in the use of re-
sources, or for various distributions of income and wealth and of
gains and losses incident to change. Clearly, it tells us nothing about
the distribution of power, whether economic or political, or about
the other social and political repercussions of economic activity.
CROSS-ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND
BRIEFER mention will be made of several suggestions for distinguish-
ing markets primarily on the basis of the conditions of demand for
the product of the individual firm. While these proposals differ in
detail, they are all concerned primarily with the discretion available
to the firm to affect price or output.
10Fordiscussion of this issue, see in particular Kenneth F. Boulcling, "Wel-
fare Economics," in Bernard F. Haley, A Survey of Contemporary Economics, U
(Irwin, 1952);I.M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1950);NancyRuggles, 'The Welfare Basis of the Marginal Cost
Pricing Principle," and "Recent Developments in the Theory of Marginal Cost
Pricing," Review of Economic Studies (1949-1950),pp.29-46, 107-126.
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A frequent approach to the problem of monopoly power has been
via the concept of the cross elasticity of demand.1' If there are no
close substitutes for the product X of a firm—that is, no other prod-
ucts whose price changes may affect the demand for X—the cross
elasticities of demand for X with respect to all products are zero.
This is the limiting case of perfect monopoly. At the other extreme
is the case of pure competition where present units of demand will
shift from one supplier to another upon the slightest difference in
price. In this case the cross elasticities of demand for X with respect
to the products of some rivals approach infinity. The more usual
case is that in which the cross elasticities of demand for X with re-
spect to the products of many other firms are zero but with respect
to one or more is greater than zero but less than infinity.
This index, or cluster of indexes, is designed to indicate some-
thing about the range of discretion with respect to price available to
the individual firm. While it is unambiguous in the limiting cases
of perfect competition and a profit-seeking monopolist in static con-
ditions, it is of doubtful significance in the intermediate range of
cases or under conditions of change. It does not really indicate the
range of effective discretion since it rules out of consideration rele-
vant non-price factors and does not distinguish between alternative
anticipations of rivals' reactions that may be crucial in markets with
few firms. Thus, in the case of two firms selling a homogeneous
product, the cross elasticities may be infinite. Yet it is well known
that the behavior of the rivals and the resulting price and produc-
tion policies may take any of several forms.'2 Moreover, this approach
indicates nothing about non-price types of discretion, the objective
conditions of the market, the firms' activities, or the results of such
activities. In a world of fluctuation and change, this approach has all
the other limitations discussed in connection with the Lerner index.
ROTHSCHILD'S INDEX
K. W. ROTHSCHILD has suggested an index of the degree of monop-
oly designed to show how far a particular firm controls the market
for a commodity.'3 He defines his index as m(tan a/tan b) where
11 Nicholas Kaldor, "Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity," Economica,
February 1935, pp. 33-50; Stigler, op. cit., pp. 205-207.
12 Chamberlin, op. cit., Chap. 3; Feliner, op. cit.
28 K. W. Rothschild, 'The Degree of Monopoly," Economica, February 1942,
pp. 24-39.Fordiscussion ot this, see Joe S. Bain, "Measurements of the Degree
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d d' is the demand curve for the individual firm on the assumption
that "competing firms do not change their price (or output)" and
D D' is the demand curve on the assumption that "other firms
change their price (or output) in the same or some other predeter-
mined way as the firm in question." This index presumes, then,
some knowledge or assumption concerning the reactions of other
firms. It may be equal to or greater than zero and equal to or less
than one. If the demand curve for the product of the individual
firm is independent of the reactions of other firms, d d' and D D'
coincide and the index is equal to one. If the firm is producing under
purely competitive conditions so that its price is market-determined
and completely independent of its own discretion, the index is
equal to zero.
While this index has the advantage of making allowance for the
reactions of rivals, it seems otherwise to have all the disadvantages
and ambiguities incident to the approach through cross-elasticities.
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of Monopoly: A Note," Economica, February igj, pp. 66-68; K. W. Rothschild,
"A Further Note on the Degree of Monopoly," Economica, February ig,pp.
69-70;Theodore Morgan, "A Measure of Monopoly in Selling," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, May 1946, pp. 461-463.MONOPOLY POWER AND CONCENTRATION
PAPANDREOU'S INDEX
PAPANDREOU, emphasizing the efforts of rivals to invade one an-
other's markets, has proposed to measure the competitive relations
among firms by two coefficients, one of penetration and one of in-
sulation.14 His coefficient of penetration, which measures the ca-
pacity of a firm to penetrate its competitors' markets by a price cut,
takes into account both its capacity to attract customers and to
match with units of supply the demand that stands ready to shift
upon a price change. His coefficient of insulation is designed to
measure the degree of nonresponsiveness of the actual volume of
sales of a firm to price cuts initiated by its competitors. This
approach has the advantage of recognizing the limits that the avail-
ability of capacity places upon competitive strategies, a factor neg-
lected by the simple cross-elasticity approach. But otherwise this ap-
proach seems to suffer from most of the remaining limitations of the
cross-elasticity approach, a fact that Papandreou clearly concedes.15
BAIN'S INDEX OF PROFITABILITY
JOE S. BAIN has been the principal proponent of the profit rate as a
measure of monopoly power or "of deviations from competitive
equilibrium." In his article of 194116heproposed that the profit
rate be defined as "in any short period the ratio of the net earnings
of that period (quasi-rents less depreciation computed as indicated)
to the replacement cost of service value of those assets of the firm
which it could economically hold at a minimum and produce its
present output." A comparison of the rate of profit so defined with
the rate of interest "is therefore an indicator of the deviation of the
earnings behavior of the firm from a selected norm. A deviation for
a year or two is obviously significant of nothing more than that the
firm operates in a cyclical economy. A persistent deviation over a
period of years, however, is an indication of a failure of the com-
petitive mechanism to force an approximation to equilibrium, and
therefore a probable indication of monopoly or monopsony power,
or less probably of pure competition with persistent impediment
to entry."7
14A.G. Papandreou, "Market Structure and Monopoly Power," American Eco-
nomic Review, September 1949, pp. 883-897.
15 Ibid., p. 897.
16 Joe S. Bain, "The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, February 1941, pp. 271-293.
11 Ibid., pp. 287-288.
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It is clear that the Bain index may reflect the cumulative effect of
several factors. For an economy in the state of circular flow it would
reflect(1) profits incident to limitations upon entry into a given
industry, whether the industry is "monopolistic" or purely competi-
tive,(2) monopsonistic profits, and ()thewasteful costs incident
to investment in excess of the minimum necessary to produce present
output.'8 In a world of economic fluctuation and secular change, the
rate of profit would include as well ()theeffects of fortuitous
change, (5) temporary profits and losses incident to the adjustment
of the economy to exogenous changes, and (6) profits and losses
incident to innovation.
The profit rate so defined is primarily an index of the gross effects
of economic activity. It should be noted that since the rate of profit
as defined by Bain involves an allowance for unnecessary expendi-
tures with reference to the competitive norm, this profit rate has no
necessary relation to the profit rate as viewed by business in a private
enterprise economy. Bain emphasizes the significance of his index
because of the effect of the profit rate "directly on the functional
distribution of income, and indirectly on the propensity to consume,
the level of employment, etc."9 But in view of the synthetic nature
of the Bain index, including as it does elements of unnecessary in-
vestment expenditures as well as profit in the usual economic sense,
this index would seem to be of limited significance in these respects.
Two situations with the same rate of profit in Bain's sense are con-
sistent with different rates of profit in the usual sense and, there-
fore, with different effects on the distribution of income, the pro-
pensity to consume, the level of employment, etc.
The Bain index seems to be oriented primarily at welfare con-
siderations, i.e. at providing some index of the efficiency with which
resources are allocated and used. For purposes of both analysis and
policy it is useful to separate the two components of the Bain index:
(i) profits in the traditional economic sense and (2) unnecessary in-
vestment expenditures. The first component reflects the willingness
and ability of owners of resources to respond to profit differentials
and as such indicates in a rough way the effectiveness of the profit
18Itis not clear that Bain would remove from "costs" and add to the "profits"
any uariable expenditure which would be unnecessary in the "competitive norm,"
e.g. advertising, although this would seem to be consistent with his objective.
19Bain,"Measurements of the Degree of Monopoly: A Note," as cited, p. 66.
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stimulus in allocating resources to various sectors of the economy.
It is a reasonably objective index. The second component is indica-
tive in part of the effectiveness with which resources are organized
within any sector, the extent of "wasteful" or "unnecessary" invest-
ment. As such this second component depends upon some compari-
son of the actual organization of resources within a sector with some
"ideal" organization.
A normal rate of profit as measured by the first component is
indicative of a low range of discretion consistent with survival. A
high rate of profit associated with the first component of the Bain
index may be indicative of either fortuitous circumstances, the im-
perfect adaptation of resources because of the time necessary for
such adaptation, innovation, or a monopolistic or monopsonistic
position. Since the first two must be ruled out as typically unimpor-
tant for long periods, a persisting high rate of profit requires further
analysis to determine whether it arises from a more or less perma-
nently entrenched position or from a monopoly position which is
continually renewed by successful innovative effort. But although
this component may be suggestive of the extent of discretion open
to the firm, it tells us little about the types of discretion available.
The second component of the Bain index indicates the extent to
which assets are held by a given firm or industry in excess of the
minimum necessary to produce its present output. Clearly this re-
flects the wastes of investment due to excess capacity or "competi-
tive" strategies. But it does not indicate whether there is "excessive"
multiplication of products, nor does it indicate whether firms have
found the most efficient method of production, nor whether the
market is stimulating or retarding the improvement of products and
processes. A normal rate of profit may be consistent with enlightened,
progressive management working under aggressively competitive
conditions or with inefficient, lethargic, routine management func-
tioning in a protected position.20
20 L should be noted in passing that despite the note of optimism in Bain's
article of 1941 concerning the feasibility of approaching such an estimate of
profits, I know of no attempts to date to do so. Bain's own efforts in his study
of the Pacific Coast petroleum industry (Pacific Coast Petroleum Industry,parts,
University of California Press, 1944-1947), and his general study of the relation
of profit rates to industrial concentration ('Relation of Profit Rate to Industry
Concentration, American Manufacturing, 1936-1940," Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, August 1951, pp. 293-324) consider profits on "actual" rather than "eco-
nomically necessary" investment.
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3. Ratios of Concentration
A LARGE body of literature has developed in the last two decades on
industrial concentration and its significance.' The concentration
ratio is a common-sense approach, treating sectors of the economy
at the level of the industry rather than at the level of the firm. But
the industry concept raises serious classificatory problems of both a
theoretical and practical sort, problems of delineating the boundaries
of the industry in terms of the range of products and firms, and the
geographical area to be included. These problems of classification
are discussed in other papers in this Conference. It is sufficient to
note that if the industry is defined too broadly, the concentration
index may tend to understate the monopolistic potentialities of a
situation; if it is defined too narrowly, the monopolistic potential.
ities may be grossly exaggerated.
The concentration ratio is, of course, a useful index of one charac-
teristic of market structures. But the crucial question is whether
there is any close correlation between the degree of concentration
and the character of the competitive forces at work in a sector of the
economy. An influential body of opinion holds that there is at least
a rough correlation. This view holds that a combination of high
concentration of output in a market with large size, measured in
terms of the value of assets or number of employees, will generally
be associated with monopoly rather than competition.
But what does the concentration ratio tell us? A low concentra-
tion ratio indicates a number of points of initiative and the exist-
ence of numerous alternatives available to buyers. It suggests that
the range of discretion open to any one firm consistent with survival
will be narrow. If there is relatively free entry and the absence of
restrictive agreements, it is probable that there will be considerable
pressure upon the firm to be efficient in its production, procurement,
and marketing. Moreover, one would expect a general tendency for
resources to flow in response to profit differentials. The concentra-
tion ratio will not, however, distinguish the kinds of competition,
21Seein addition to articles in this Conference, The Structure of the American
Economy, National Resources Committee, '939; Willard L. Thorp and Walter
F. Crowder, The Structure of Industry, TNEC, Monograph 27,1941; TheCon-
centration of Productive Facilities, iji,FederalTrade Commission, 1949;M.A.
Adelman, "The Measurement of Industrial Concentration," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, November 1951,pp.269-296; Corwin D. Edwards and oth-
ers, "Four Comments on 'The Measurement of Industrial Concentration'; with a
Rejoinder by Professor Adelman," Review of Economics and Statistics, May
1952,pp.156-178.
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i.e. between situations where competition takes the form of rivalry
in price and those where it is deflected into sales effort or product
differentiation. Moreover, it is in no way indicative of the oppor-
tunities and incentives to add to the body of knowledge or to de-
velop resources. The most that can be assumed is that resources are
responding to profit opportunities and that incentives to efficient
use of resources within the firm are strong. Whether the environ-
ment promotes economic progress or whether it fosters "wasteful"
non-price competition is open to question. How "workable" or "de-
sirable" is the competition will depend upon further findings on
these matters. But one can assume that output, efficiency, and inno-
vation are not being restricted by the arbitrary decision of a few.
More serious difficulties arise in interpreting high concentration
ratios. It is clear in such cases that the market has some monopo-
listic characteristics: itis not purely or perfectly competitive and
there is some degree of mutual interdependence. But a typical view
goes beyond this and assumes that the degree of discretion is sub-
stantial and that this discretion will be used for purposes detrimental
to the best use of resources.
In a situation where the structure of the market, preference sched-
ules, the supply of resources, and the body of knowledge can be
taken as given or as subject primarily to exogenous change, it would
be reasonable to assume that a high concentration ratio indicates
monopolistic practices, i.e. practices restricting production or waste-
ful of resources. There are markets to which such a model may be
applied without doing too great violence to the facts. The case of
the cigarette industry, which has been well documented by two
studies recently, is a case in point.22 But even in a market approach-
ing this state, it is not at all clear that there will be a high correla-
tion between the degree of concentration and the degree of restric-
tiveness or waste. The degree of discretion, the activities of the firm,
and the economic results will depend upon many factors. Among
these will be the substitutability of products not included within
the industry; the effectiveness of potential competition, which de-
pends upon the availability of knowledge and resources and the
costs of entry, and upon the character of patent control and the ex-
tent of equivalent inventions; the expectations concerning rivals'
22 Richard B. Tennant,TheAmerican Cigarette Industry(Yale University
Press, 1950) and William H. Nicholls, Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry
(Vanderbilt University Press, 1951). In this case the principal exception to the
circumstances envisaged by the typical static model is sales effort designed to
shift preferences as between brands.
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reactions and the competitive strategies resulting therefrom. More-
over, the extent and effect of economic power will depend not only
upon the proportion of the market that a firm controls, but also
upon the extent of integration of the firm and the point in the pro-
duction and distribution process at which it is located. There is a
substantial difference in the potential power of a firm or a few firms
controlling the production of a basic raw material such as aluminum
and the power of the large chains in the retail grocery field. The
way this power is used in such cases and its economic effects like-
wise differ.
But in the modern economy in which the activities of the firm
play an important part in economic change, the concentration ratio
has further limitations. In such an economy the activities of the
firm may be as important as the structure of the industry. It is cru-
cial in considering highly concentrated industries to remember that
the market itself is often an important variable in the competitive
process. There is plenty of evidence in the last fifty years that the
market positions of many dominant firms were insecure. A firm
must be constantly alert to defend and enlarge its position. The
question is how its position may be secured. For this reason, the con-
centration ratio must be regarded not only as one of the factors
conditioning the current behavior of the market but also as one of
the results of previous behavior. A high concentration ratio may be
the result of aggressive, restrictive, and exclusive practices as in the
case of many of the early "trusts," or it may be the result of control
over strategic resources or patents. But it may also be the result of
aggressive policies of innovation, market development, and cost re-
duction as in the aluminum industry.
The history of Alcoa is a significant case in point. It was virtually
the sole domestic producer of virgin aluminum ingots from the be-
ginning of the industry until World War II. Its discretion was lim-
ited only by rival products such as copper and steel, by imports of
aluminum often limited by cartels and tariffs, and by the supply of
secondary aluminum. There is no doubt that Alcoa had a wide
range of discretion in many markets for a long period of time, al-
though we are a long way from understanding the extent of this
discretion.
But consider the other side of the picture. Alcoa was responsible
for the development of a new basic material, and for continuous
research into new uses for this material and new processes for its
production. Any of the usual statistical measures of concentration in
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industry during this period will show that this industry was from
the beginning highly concentrated. Moreover, since the industry
represented an increasing share of the economy, any overall index
of industrial concentration would show ceteris paribus an increas-
ing concentration. Yet the net impact of Alcoa was to increase com-
petition by increasing the number of alternatives available to metal
fabricators and consumers. Its effect was to increase the cross elas-
ticities of demand for a wide variety of products, thereby narrowing
the discretion available to producers of other materials for which
it was a substitute.
These remarks are made without prejudice to the question of
whether some other structure of the aluminum industry would have
increased or reduced the competitive thrust of Alcoa or whether
there are on balance good reasons of public policy to disapprove of
the concentration of control of a basic material such as aluminum
in the hands of a single firm, no matter how benevolent its inten-
tions or beneficent its effects. I wish only to emphasize that sole
reliance upon concentration ratios may lead to a distorted view of
the competitive process. While the concentration ratio of an in-
creasingly important industry remained virtually stationary at ioo,
the markets for metals were experiencing a dramatic increase in the
competitive forces.
But the history of a firm developing a new product or a new
method where there are no legal or other obstacles to entry need
not be one leading to a high rate of concentration. A policy of short-
run profit maximizing may lead instead to the multiplication of
firms and a low rate of concentration, the innovator acting as an
umbrella for the development of new competitors.23 This contrasts
with a policy of low prices and high volume that might result in
high concentration. We would have to know a good deal more about
these alternatives if we are to judge the relative merits in terms of
economic or other effects. In the kind of world we live in behavior
is not necessarily structurally determined by preference schedules,
production functions, and the prices of the factors of production.
Skepticism about the significance of concentration as an index of
monopoly behavior is reinforced by the limited studies of the effects
of concentration that are available. Some of these are discussed in
other papers. Mention may be made of a few. Alfred Neal in his
study of price flexibility in the great depression concluded:
23Chamberlin,op. cit., Chap. 5.
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"First for the 1929-1933 period, there was a slight tendency, as has
been claimed by proponents of the concentration thesis, for produc-
tion to fall most where price fell least. (This relation does not ob-
tain in the 1929-1931 period.) Neither price change nor production
change, however, is to be explained by concentration. Rather, dif-
ferential price changes are explicable by differential unit direct cost
changes, and differential production changes are to be explained in
terms of demand shifts which are a consequence of the nature of
the demands concerned.
"Secondly, differential price behavior among industries for both
comparisons (1929-1931 and 1929.1933) is to be explained for the
most part by differential unit direct cost behavior rather than by
concentration.
"Thirdly, concentration does not even explain the difference be-
tween actual price declines and those which could be expected on
the basis of changes in direct cost. This conclusion is reasonable in
view of the differences in cost structures among industries.
"In the fourth place, however, concentration did have a small but
significant influence upon the decline in the difference between unit
price and unit direct cost—the overhead-plus-profits margin. This
margin tended to decline least where concentration was high; most
where it was low."24
Similarly Ruggles in his paper in this Conference concludes with
reference to the period 1929-1932 that "the major patterns of price
behavior in the economy can be explained in terms of factors other
than concentration."2 Finally, although Bain found a correlation
between concentration and the rate of profit for the period 1936.
1940, his results are highly tentative.26
The crucial significance of the degree of concentration as a tool
of economic analysis or as a guide to public policy has yet to be
established. While it may be assumed that it is in the area of con-
centrated industries that the important cases of monopoly restric-
tions will appear, it has not been established that there is a unique
correlation between the degree of concentration and either the de-
gree of discretion available to the firm, the types of business prac.
tices pursued, or the character of the economic effects. This does not
mean that further work may not show some relation between con-
24 Alfred C. Neal, Industrial Concentration and Price Inflexibility (American
Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 165-166.
25 See p. 488
26 Bain, 'Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration," as cited, pp.
293-324.
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centration and important aspects of competition. Moreover, evidence
on concentration may be administratively useful as a basis for pre-
liminary screening of cases under review with an eye to possible
antitrust proceedings or other policy action. But it appears both
on a priori grounds and on the basis of such empirical evidence as
we have that the extent of concentration is only one of several im-
portant variables to be examined, whether the interest is in eco-
nomic analysis or public policy.
4. Some Suggestions for Further Research
ATrEMPTS to characterize various sectors of our economy in a mean-
ingful way by simple indexes of concentration, profitability, and
monopoly have not been very successful. There is a growing con-
sensus that further progress in developing a meaningful theory of
market structures and behavior lies in empirical work designed to
test the significance of various hypotheses and to suggest new hy-
potheses of more relevance to the economic experience to which such
a theory is addressed.
This field of economics, which has grown out of the very center
of neoclassical economics, is at about the stage in which the field of
business cycles stood in 1900,beforethe pioneering data collection
and analysis of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Har-
vard Committee on Economic Statistics, and other similar groups.
But if we are to achieve an understanding of the competitive proc-
esses, we must develop a verified theory of market structure and
behavior relevant to an economy in constant change. Such a theory
should explain not only the processes by which wants and resources
are mutually adapted, but also the constantly changing structure of
markets and behavior by which this mutual adaptation is brought
about. While intensive studies of individual firms, industries, and
trade practices must play an important part in such a development,
their usefulness would be immeasurably increased if they could be
related to a broad, empirical analysis of the competitive process. At
present the principal frame of reference is the vision of the static
economy or the circular flow, in which change is treated as essen-
tially exogenous to the system, and market structure and behavior
are taken as structurally determined. This vision, the main contours
of which date back to Adam Smith, represents a substantial contri-
bution to economic thinking, which is still valuable for purposes of
economic analysis. But while some are inclined to underestimate its
usefulness, most will agree that this vision has serious shortcomings.
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Whether we shall be able to devise a more fruitful vision of our
economy remains to be seen.
An important step forward would be the development of an over-
all picture of the changing contours of business structure and be-
havior in major sectors and subsectors of the economy. It should be
feasible to develop for major sectors and subsectors a series of in-
dexes reflecting the competitive processes over substantial periods of
time. These indexes might cover such factors as (i) strategic aspects
of industrial structure, e.g. numbers, size, concentration, rate of
growth, and change in rank order of firms;(2) important aspects of
industrial behavior, e.g. price and cost flexibility, price and cost
trends, sales efforts, and technological and managerial innovation;
and ()importantaspects of results, e.g. changes in the rate of in-
vestment, rate of output, gross margins, and profit rates and the de-
velopment of new product lines. Clearly, much remains to be done
in defining and constructing adequate indexes. But there are many
data at hand that have not been fully analyzed for these purposes.
I urge such a sector analysis of industrial structure and behavior
because of a belief that the competitive processes operate in some-
what different ways in various sectors and subsectors of the economy.
Consequently, an analysis of the similarities and differences between
sectors and subsectors and within sectors and subsectors may sug-
gest fruitful hypotheses. It is a plausible hypothesis that various
structural and behavioral characteristics of markets will have dif-
ferent effects depending on the sector or subsector of the economy
in which they appear. Thus I suspect that high concentration will
be associated with more serious monopoly effects in the mining and
metal industries than in retail distribution. I suspect it will also be
associated with more serious monopoly effects in industries where
technological change is slow and comes from sources external to the
industry than where technological change is rapid and is initiated
within the industry. Such a sector analysis, in addition to providing
a frame of reference for more detailed studies of individual firms
and industries and assisting in the development of further hypotheses,
should also aid in bridging the gap between micro- and macro-
economic theory, a gap that has become increasingly serious.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to catalogue the variables that
might prove significant in various sectors of the economy, but a few
factors deserve more attention. In specifying the changing structure
of an industry or sector of the economy, it may be useful to explore
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not only the changing number, size, concentration, and degree of
integration of firms but also changes, if any, in the rank order of the
largest firms. Does the rank order of firms change more slowly in
some sectors than in others? Are such differences related in any
systematic way to other identifiable characteristics such as the impor-
tance of the control of raw materials or innovation and technolog-
ical change? Are there any indications that frequent changes in rank
order tend to stimulate the competitive factors?
Clearly, the effectiveness with which the competitive process is
allocating resources should be a principal object of concern. In a
freely competitive society one expects resources to be attracted to
high-profit opportunities and to be repelled from low-profit oppor-
tunities. As an index of this tendency, one might explore the re-
sponsiveness of new investment to differences in the rate of profit.
This suggests an index correlating the rate of new investment with
the rate of profit on existing investment. Such an index would indi-
cate the obstacles or resistances to freedom of entry and exit. Be-
cause new investment is more mobile than sunk investment, one
might also expect to find a closer correlation in expanding industries
than in unprofitable and contracting industries. One might explore
the hypothesis that the degree of responsiveness of new investment
to profit opportunities is inversely correlated with the degree of con-
centration, and also the hypothesis that the responsiveness is in-
versely correlated with the asset size of the individual firm. In any
event, the extent to which the flow of new investment responds to
profit differences should be a useful index of the allocative process
in a market economy.
Further study of the short-run flexibility of prices, which is the
subject of Ruggles' paper in this Conference, should be another
aspect of the over-all description of the contours of market structure
and behavior. Such a study might be supplemented with a study of
fluctuations in gross margins, a measure that in some cases would
serve as a first approximation to the Lerner index of monopoly
power discussed above. Ruggles' paper suggests the usefulness of
sector analysis for these problems and more particularly of the sig-
nificance of fluctuations in costs as an explanation of differences in
price flexibility. But how are we to explain differences in cost be-
havior? What part does concentration play in the differences be-
tween short-run fluctuation in prices of such different raw materials
as minerals and metals on the one hand and natural fibers on the
other? Are differences in the flexibility of wage rates due to differ-
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ences in the organization of labor, to differences in the degree of
concentration in the employing industry, or to both?
Clearly, some indexes of differences in the rate of technological
change and innovation are called for. We need to develop some
picture of the differences in the rate of technological change and
innovation in various sectors of the economy and to test rival hy-
potheses concerning the effect of concentration and monopoly upon
these processes.
The problem of technological change has, of course, many facets.
What might we hope to measure? We would ideally like to know
something about the rate of technological change and innovation in
various sectors of the economy in comparison with the potential for
such change. Such a study poses many serious problems. Expendi-
tures on research and development suggest themselves immediately
as one item on which data might be obtained. But before the sig-
nificance of this would be clear we should need some studies of the
economies of scale in research and development and of the ad-
vantages of integrating research and development with commercial
exploitation and production. This suggests the need for case studies
in the organization of research and development.
In some industries that have undergone considerable change of
products it should be possible to acquire data on the extent to which
the product mix has undergone change over a period of time, there-
by indicating the extent to which the old products have been dis-
placed by new. The rate of diffusion of new ideas might also be
investigated. A study of the period elapsing between the state of an
initial invention and the time at which it becomes commercially
exploited and finally widely diffused would be useful. These and
other variables seem worth exploring.
Two tentative hypotheses may be suggested that it might be pos-
sible to test from such data on technological change and innovation:
(i) assuming that firms act independently in their technological and
other decisions, the extent and speed of innovation will increase with
the degree of concentration up to some critical point and will de-
cline abruptly when the number of firms becomes very small, for
example, one or two; and (2) in industries with high rates of inno-
vation, the rank order of firms would change more frequently than
where innovation is more gradual and less strategic.
A program of research along these lines would be a major under-
taking. But a broad statistical picture of the anatomy of industry
and the processes of competition in major sectors and subsectors of
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the economy is badly needed. Such an undertaking might well be
the outcome of this Conference and the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research might well serve as its focus.
COMMENT
JoE S. BAIN, University of California, Berkeley
MILLER has discussed the deficiencies of several measures of concen-
tration that have been advanced in the last twenty years (most of
them ten or more years ago), and has offered some suggestions for
further work directed toward classifying and typing the market
situations in which business firms operate.
With Miller's general view of the problem of classifying and
typing market situations I am in substantial agreement. That is, I
agree that we should distinguish, for purposes of classification,
types of market structure, types of internal and market conduct of
firms, and types of market performance or results emergent from the
conduct of firms.(I am willing to add, if measurement is feasible
at all, types of situations with respect to the "power" of firms.) I
agree further that each of these things—structure, conduct, and
performance—is in essence multidimensional, and that classification
on any level will be correspondingly complex. I agree finally that in
establishing classifications at each level and in looking for associa-
tions between types at different levels_—certainly the crucial task—
we should not limit ourselves to the classificatory systems and ex-
planatory hypotheses put forth by static price theory. I may add
that it is my impression that this general range of views is now
shared by a large number of economists interested in the field of
price studies.
Having said so much, I can scarcely disagree with Miller's major
criticism of each of his "theoretical indexes" of monopoly. Each deals
with only one dimension either of market structure (as for example
in the case of simple cross elasticities, the Rothschild measure, or the
Papandreou measure) or of performance (as in the case of the Lerner
measure or my own profit measure), and as such it is insufficient. No
single simple measure on any level will serve adequately to distin-
guish situations that may differ in many ways; a large number of one-
dimensional measures must be used simultaneously to deal with a
population of cases that differ in many dimensions. Precisely the
same may of course be said of the measure of industry concentration.
This view seems sound if hardly novel.
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It may be suggested that a more charitable view of many indi-
vidual measures of structure, conduct, or performance might be
entertained if no one of them were expected to provide a self-suffi-
cient classification of market situations. Detailed information on
cross elasticities of demand among firms, for example, would be very
useful—along with many other sorts of information_in typing mar-
ket structures. In saying that each of many individual measures has
a limited usefulness, it seems to me that Miller too much emphasizes
the limitations and too little the positive usefulness. This same ob-
servation might be made about any relatively grandiose scheme of
assembling data such as Miller suggests, wherein an array of indi-
vidual partial measures, each with its limitations, would be dis-
covered.
Two final comments may be added. First, although our ultimate
goal may be a system of classification and explanation of markets and
market performance which simultaneously comprehends numerous
dimensions of market structure and conduct and which is adequately
dynamic in its reference, a good deal may be discovered first by seek-
ing for the partial associations of, for example, one aspect of market
structure to one aspect of performance_and in this pursuit the use-
fulness of even static price theory as a source of hypotheses is not to
be overly discounted.
Second, the outlines of the project of assembling data for em-
pirical research that Miller puts forth are vague about some perti-
nent details. As these details are filled in, it will be found that the
structure of the empirical research project—as regards definitions,
procedures, hypotheses to be tested, and so forth—either will be arbi-
trary or ad hoc in character, or will be dependent upon some familiar
or newly elaborated theoretical structure. Miller apparently eschews
dependence upon existing theoretical structures, but he provides no
systematic or established substitute. If the research effort he con-
templates is to transcend the level of strictly pragmatic experiment,
an extensive and thoroughgoing theoretical analysis should first be
made in order to justify as fully as possible on an a priori level the
definitions to be adopted and applied, the sorts of data to be col-
lected, and the hypotheses to be tested. In this connection, tradi-
tional price theory, with all its limitations, may be surprisingly useful.
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